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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Revival of Monetary Policy 
Since the Second World War a number of countries have returned 
to an active use of monetary policy. The revival of general credit con-
trols as policy instruments has assumed forms somewhat different from 
the ones familiar in pre-war ~ays. Restrictive monetary policy instead 
of an 11 easy money" policy has become the general trend. In addition to 
simpl~, classical techniques of discount rat~ changes and open market 
opera~ions, central banks have added a variety of new and complex wea-
pons to their arsenal, i.e. selective credit controls. The economic 
policy·' and underlying financial background has changed greatly in many 
countries. The goals of maintaining a high level of employment and eco-
nomic growth without incurring inflation provide a motive force in the 
formation of various policies • . Monetary policy has been adapted, there-
fore, to the present needs of the economy in different countries. 
The emphasis throughout this study is on the analysis of different tech-
niques used in applying selective credit controls. 
The revival of monetary policy and increased use of selective 
credit controls is based on enlarging the definition and scope of mone-
tary policy. There are three aspects of this evolution. 
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1. According to traditional monetary doctrine, the central bank 
should concern itself with maintaining the value of money by control-
ling its volume. On the other hand, the credit control doctrine refers 
to the effects of actions of the _monetary authorities on conditions in 
the credit market, that is, on the co~t and the availability aspects 
of credit and tenns of lending, etc. This does not necessarily deny 
that the central bank's actions bring about changes in the size of the 
stock of money. Actually, central banks everywhere have concentrated 
on credit control as the basic pattern of their monetary policy. Until 
the beginning of the 20th century the ''real bills" ideology was most 
persistent; it asserted that as a regulator of the volume of money and 
credit, the central bank should rediscount only "real bills" so that 
the co~ercial banks would observe sound banking principles in making 
loans and therefore provide finance only for short term bonafide trans-
actions. Consequently, "· •• the expansiop (?f bank money will be i n 
proportion to any extension in trade that may take place, or to the 
'needs of trade' ••• 11 1 According to the modern credit view, the bank-
ing system is not a monetary agency but a source of loanable funds. 
In. most discussions major emphasis is given to the ~ole of the central 
bank as the detenniner and controller of the volume, cost, and availa-
bility of loanable funds. The control of liquidity, therefore, should 
be the main task of the central bank. "· •• the factor which monetary 
policy should seek to influence or control ••• is nothing less than 
11. w. Mints,! History of Banking Theory (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1945), P• 9. 
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the state of liquidity of the whole economy. 112 With the advance of 
the selective credit controls, the central bank's control goes one 
step further in determining the distribution and allocation of loanable 
funds. 
2. The second aspect of the evolution was concerned with the 
application of various instruments of monetary policy. During the 
twentie~, the focus was on the cost of credit. The success of monetary 
policy was judged mainly by the eftects of the changes in the rate of 
interest. It was expected that by changing the cost of C!edit, the 
demand for credit can be expanded or contracted in the interest of the 
economy. But the experience after the recovery fr_om the depression, 
and especially after 1939, implied that the availability aspect of ere-
dit in pr~ctice is as important as its cost. Because of this, the im-
portance of the use of other instruments, like open market operations 
and flexible reserve ratios, was realized. It also became increasingly 
realized that the monetary authorities should be able to locate and 
control the particular source of instability or speculation in the ere-
dit mechanis~, if the need arose. This realization showed the impor-
tance of the selective credit controis. 
3. During the post-war _years, non-bank financial intermediaries 
were getting more :important in the financial structure of the ecQnomy. 
They participated with the connnercial banks in tne expanpion of credit 
-- · _. . . 
and the provisiqn of liquidity to the economy which the central banks 
intended to control. . But no powers were authorized for the central 
2committee on the Working of the Monetary System-Report (London, 
H.M.s.o., 1959), P• 337. 
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banks to control directly the operations of these institutions. From 
the view-point of monetary management, this has become a disturbing 
factor. When a restrictive monetary policy is applied with the ultimate 
view to restrict the general spending in the economy, these institutions 
lessen the impact of the actions of the central bank, by making the li-
quidity at their disposal available to the spenqers. Many central banks 
have found it necessary to influence and control these specialized 
institutions. In other words, the need is felt that the control of 
the central bank should be extended to the non-bank financial institu-
tions, too. A few central banks, such as the Bank of England and the 
Bank of Canada, have already tried, by way of moral suasion, to influ-
ence the lending activities of some such non-bank financial institutions 
with a view to making monetary policy more effective. This aspect, 
though not discussed in this thesis, is a very important and interest-
ing part of the evolutionary nature and extending scope of the monetary 
policy. 
B. Purpose and Plan of Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the application of selec-
tive credit controls in the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
India. The reason for se~ecting these three countries is that each of 
them has a different financial structure. The financial structure of 
the United Kingdom is highly centralized, while that of the United 
States is highly decentralized and diversified. India has a peculiar 
financial structure, with the existence of a non-monetised sector on 
the one end and indigenous banks on the other. Both the United Kingdom 
and the United States are experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. 
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Both nations are interested in shaping monetary policy in such a way 
that a high level of employment and output is maintained without incur~ 
ri~g inflation. India has somewhat different objective$. She wants 
to devise monetary pol~cy as a means of allocating the available funds 
to planned priorities and to control speculative tendencies so as to 
relieve inflationary pressures. 
The prevailing socio-political outlook has its impact on the eco-
nomic ideology, too. It is more so reflected in the application of 
the various instruments of credit control. In Great Britian and other 
European countries, as well as in India and many other developing econo-
mies, selective credit controls are used quite extensively along with 
general instruments. In the United States, general credit controls are 
preferred to selective controls; the latter are acceptable only as emer-
gency measures. It is intended to make explicit the impact of socio-
economic ideology in the application of selective credit controls in 
respective countries. 
Whether selective credit controls should be included as one of the 
per~nent techniques of monetary management is a controversial issue. 
Whether it should be given a complementary or substitute role to the 
other instruments is also a highly discussed topic. No attempt is made 
here to pass judgement on these issues. 
Selective credit controls are a new addition to the existing instru-
ments of monetary policy. This study implies that they can be used along 
with other instruments to increase the scope and effectiveness of mone-
tary management in general._ They can also be used to some extent to 
solve the problems of inflation and credit allocation in the economy 
according to priorities. 
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The next chapter discusses selective credit controls in general. 
The need for the application of the selective credit controls is explained 
by hinting at the limitations of the general monetary controls. In the 
last two sections of the chapter selective controls are analyzed in their 
various aspects such as historica~ development, different objectives, 
and types and techniques. 
Chapters on the United Kingdom, the United States, and India begin 
with a brief survey of .the financial structure of the respective coun-
try. A short analysis has also been made in each chapter regarding the 
effectiveness of the general instruments of credit control. Selective 
credit controls are then discussed, in view of the financial structure, 
the needs of the economy which monetary policy is expected to achieve. 
CHAPTER II 
SELECTIVE CREDIT CONTROLS IN THE 
CREDIT CONTROL MECHANISM 
A. General Credit Controls 
Control of the capacity of commercial banks to create credit is 
the most important function of the central bank. Traditionally, bank-
rate, open market operations, and minimum reserve requirements are the 
three instruments used for affecting the reserves of commercial banks, 
on the basis of which the credit is created. A brief analysis of each 
would be appropriate at this point. 
1. B~nk~Rate 
Bank-rate influences the cost of credit, i.e., the rate of interest. 
As the lender of the last resort, the central bank rediscounts eligible 
paper and makes advances to the commercial banks, charging the bank-
rate for each loan. A rise in bank-rate is expected to be followed by 
a corresponding rise in short-term market rates. The cost of borrowing 
in general increases. This in turn decreases the demand for credit and 
consequently the total flow of spending. Thus credit creating capacity 
of the banks is not directly affected. However, because of the decrease 
in the demand for credit, less credit will be created which is exactly 
the purpose of the central bank in raisin~ the bank-rate. Primary ef-
fects on short-term rates affect the long-term rates . A fall in the 
bank-rate similarly makes money conditions easy and increases the demand 
7 
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for credit. In the context of inflation, bank-rate is sometimes made 
a penalty rate by keeping it at a level higher than that received by 
the commercial banks on their loans and investments. Changes in bank-
rate are generally considered as a signal or an "important index" of 
the Central bank's policy.1 The success of bank-rate policy depends 
upon the elasticity of the demand for credit, for its cost as well as 
the need of the col:nmercial banks for rediscounts at the central bank 
2. Open Market Operations 
Open market operations affect the cost and availability of credit 
by influencing the reserve position of the commercial banks. When the 
central bank sells securities, the cash reserves of the commercial 
banks are decreased and their credit creating capacity is reduced. 
When the central bank purchases securities, the cash reserves of the 
commercial banks increase, which in turn makes money conditions easy. 
Open market operations are quite flexible with respect to timing and 
magnitude. They can be simultaneously conducted in long-term as well 
as short-term securities to influence both long-term and short-term 
rates. Open market operations can be used for purposes such as to off-
set the disturbing effects of gold movements or of government loans 
for preparing background for bank-rate changes and for maintaining or-
derly conditions in the money market. The success of the open market 
operations will depend upon the response of the banks. Co-ordination 
with other instruments of credit control is also essential. 
J. Reserve Requirement Policy 
Changes in the reserve requirement ratio, i.e. ratio of required 
reserves to deposits, affect the availability of credit by influencing 
\.A.Young, "Tools and Processes of Monetary Policy," United States 
Monetary Policy (American Assembly, Columbia University, 1958), p. 25. 
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the size of the reserves necessary to support a given volume of lending. 
In other words, by changing the base for credit expansion, changes in 
the reserve requirement aim to control the credit expand~ng capacity 
of the banks. Before World War II fixed reserve requirements were used 
for maintaining necessary liquidity and solvency of the banking system. 
These requirements consisted of cash and deposits with the central bank 
in a certain proportion to their deposit liabilities. 
B. Selective Credit Controls 
1. The Role of Selective Credit Controls 
Bank-rate, open market operations, and changes in the reserve 
requirement ratio are the Hgeneral 11 instruments of monetary control 
which influence the cost, volume, and availability of credit in general. 
These instruments are indirect instruments because they influence the 
volume of credit by changing the amount of reserves on the basis of 
which the banks create credit. All these instruments can be used in 
complementary manner to increase the mutual effectiveness of the instru-
ments and of the monetary policy itself. General controls aim to con-
trol the total supply of money and credit in the economy by affecting 
all banks equally. They are, therefore, considered impersonal and 
nondiscriminatory in nature. In reality, however, general controls do 
not affect all sectors equally. General controls have different effects 
on different classes of borrowers, depending on (a) the extent to which 
borrowers rely on bank funds, (b) the existence of non4:)ank financial 
intermediaries, and (c) bargaining power of the borrowers. 2 Uniform 
2w. L. SmHh, "The Effects of Monetary Policy on the Major 
of the Economy, 11 Money and Economic Activity, ed. L. S. Ritter 
Miffin Co., Boston, 196,J"; p. 179. 
Sectors 
(Houghton 
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effects need not, however, be desired on all the sectors of the economy 
all the time. A need may arise in the context of inflation to control 
the amount of credit emanating from a particular sector generating 
inflationary tendency. Or, in an underdeveloped economy, a need may 
arise to devise monetary policy in such a way that it allocates available 
funds in channels thought desir~ble by the monetary authorities. Se-
lective credit controls along with the appropriate general quantitative 
controls may be more effective here. Selective controls are designed 
to encourage or discourage specific types of investment and expenditure 
"by differentiating between the cost and availability of credit to dif-
ferent sectors. 113 Consequently, selective controls allocate funds "with-
out directly affecting the total supply available. 114 It is worthwhile, 
therefore, to explore what selective credit controls could achieve in 
the central bank's credit control mechanism. Whether selective credit 
controls should be included in the armory of credit control operations 
as one of the instruments, and if included what importance should be 
given to them in practice, is a highly controversial issue. Throughout 
the nineteenth century, selective credit controls tended to remain in 
the background with little or no emphasis directly. It is essential, 
therefore, to explain the historical development and philosophy under-
lying the selective credit controls. 
2. Historical Development and Recent Experience 
The Real Bills doctrine f or central banking can be considered as 
a first historical glimpse of the selective approach in the central 
3 I. G. Patel, "Selective Credit Controls in Underdeveloped Economies, 11 
I.M,F. Staff Papers, IV (Washington, D. c., 1954-1955), p. 76. 
4 w. L. Smith, "The Effects of Monetary Policy on the Major 
of the Economy," Money and Economic Activity, ed. L. s. Ritter 
Miffin Co., Boston, 1961'1:' p. 179. 
Sectors 
(Houghton 
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bank's function as a lender of the last resort. It became the practice 
for the central bank to make rules and to decide the quality of the 
commercial paper which it would rediscount. Paper used to provide fixed 
capital or finance for stock market operations was not eligible for 
rediscounting at the central bank. The time of maturity for the paper 
to be eligible for rediscounting was determined to be a three months 
maximum. Thus, the selective approach was the basis on which central 
banking concepts were built. But selective credit controls as such were 
not used throughout the nineteenth century. The active use of selective 
credit controls in the twentieth century began during the Second World 
War only. During the war these controls were employed as one means 
whereby the available resources could be diverted to defense purposes. 
During the post-war years selective credit controls were used to off-
set inflationary pressures. Margin requirements and hire-purchase 
control in the United Kingdom and consumer credit control in the United 
States were widely used for this purpose. In developing economies, 
selective credit controls were tried as policy measures to diversify 
the economic structure. Efforts were made by applying various selec-
tive contro~s such as margin requirements to discourage the flow of 
funds in certain sectors. It was expected that those funds would then 
flow automatically to the desired channels. Discussions were also held 
as to the extent to which selective credit controls could be used in 
maintaining an over all stability of the monetary credit system.5 
With the revival of the monetary policy in the fifties, selective credit 
5r. G. Patel, "Selective Credit Controls in Underdeveloped Economi es p11 
I.M.F. Staff Papers, rJ (Washington, D. C., 1954-1955), p. ?J-84. 
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controls were increasingly used as a complement to the general controls. 
For example, when bank-rate was increased the application of margin re-
quirements in speculative directions or ceiling on particular types of 
loans or ~dditional directives to the banks may make the bank-rate more 
effective. 
3. Types and Techniques of Selective Credit Controls 
Selective credit controls are of two types : (a) quantitative and 
(b) qualitative.6 Quantitative controls limit the amount of credi t 
that can be granted for a particular loan or investment . Thi s can be 
achieved by ceilings on certain types of loans, or by prior approval 
from the central bank authorities, such as in Franee, or by capital 
issue control, such as in England. In some cases, such as i n India , 
the central b ank has asked the banks to limit the amount of credit in 
absolute terms. 
Qualitative controls are designed to regulate the distribution 
of credit among different sectors of the economy. This may be achieved 
by fixing maximum amounts and maturities for specific loans. Hire-
purchase control in the United Kingdom and consumer credit control in 
the United States may be included in this category. 
The methods of applying qualitative controls are different i n dif-
ferent cases. Sometimes the central bank issues direct ives to t he 
commercial banks asking them to follow a particular policy. The central 
bank is usually backed by legal powers. In some cases the arrangement 
is done on an inform.al basis. '1moral suasior:." whi ch i s widely u.sed in 
6F. B. Tamagna, "Process and Instrument of Monet ary Policy : A 
Comparative Analysis, 11 Monetary Management . (Prent.ice -Hall, New J ersey, 
1963), P• 132-158. 
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the United Kingdom is a case of such informal arrangements. "In a 
broad sense, moral suasion may be defined as the day-to-day influence 
that the central bank exercises to induce market institutions to con-
duct their operations in accordance with its general views and policies. 11 7 
Voluntary credit restraint programs in the United States was an informal 
arrangement for credit restraint. It was relatively less selective 
in nature. This was for the first time that ncn-banking financial in-
stitutions were brought under some sort of credit control. 
4. Selective Use of General Credit Controls 
General instruments of credit control can also be used in a ~se-
lective11 manner. Rediscount rate can be different for different types 
of bills, eligible for rediscount. In India, as for example, agricul-
tural bills are rediscounted at one half percent less than the quoted 
bank-rate. These preferential rates are changed sometimes without any 
change in the 11general• bank-rate. By this device, the central bank 
may be able to influence, to some extent, the sectoral distribution of 
loans. Similarly, a penalty rate on excess borrowing by the connnercial 
banks above the predetermined quota may exert quantitative limiting 
influence upon the loan potential of the banking system. 
Reserve requirements can also be used in a ·selective way. Banks 
might be permitted to include certain types of assets such as government 
securities as a part of the legal reserve requirements. This policy 
may induce the banks to invest more funds in government securities as 
an alternative for cash reserves. Interest bearing government securities 
7 Ibid., P• 135. 
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in the form of reserves are obviously preferable to interest-free de-
posits at the central bank. In other words, this system may be used 
to shift the interest anQ1 business of the commercial banks towards 
government securities or whatever the case may be. 
The best exampl·e of the selective use of the instrument of open 
market operations is 11the bills only" doctrine. The doctrine was ap-
plied in the United ~tates during 1953-1960. The essence of nthe bills 
only 11 policy wa~ that it affected short-term borrowers more relative 
to long-term borrowers. 8 
By regulating the amount, as well as the terms of lending, selec-
tive credit controls in general attempt to influence certain types of 
demand and expenditure activities qualitatively as well as quantita-
tively. Their effectiveness depends upon the efficient administration 
by the central bank and co-operation of the commercial banks in fol-
lowing the directives in real spirit. Technically, it depends upon 
the accuracy with which the purpose and use of the loan can be iden-
tified. 7 
5. Objections to Selective Credit Controls 
Selective credit controls are sometimes objected to on the ground 
that they are difficult to administer. Inefficient administration was 
one of the criticisms for Capital Issue Control in the United Kingdom. 
The Commissi~n on Money and Credit in the United States did not favor 
Consumer Credit Control for the same reason. The second argument against 
8Arthur Smithies, "Uses of Selective Credit Controls," United 
States Monetary Policy (American Assembly, Columbia University, 1958 ), 
p. 74. 
9Commission on Money and Credi t, Money~ Credit , Thei r I nfluence 
£!:!. Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1961 ), p. 72- 73· 
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Selective Credit Controls is that it is very difficult to distinguish 
accurately between the purpose of the loan mentioned by the borrower 
and actual use of the loan. In other words the controls could be evaded 
easily. Thirdly, selective credit controls are strongly opposed on 
the basis that they introduce undue interference of the government 
which is detrimental to the free enterprise economy. This is the main 
objection to Consumer Credit Control in the United States. As shall 
be seen later, most of the objection to Selective Credit Controls arises 
from ideological and environmental factors such as the financial struc-
ture of the economy. 
CHAPTER III 
UNITED KINGDOM 
A. Financial Structure 
Since credit control policy of the Bank of England is centered 
around the money market, the extent and efficacy of such policy depends 
largely on the nature of that market. It is necessary, therefore, to 
inquire into the characteristics of the institutional structure of the 
monetary system of Great Britain. 
Great Britain has a very highly organized system of financial 
institutions. Different institutions extend different types of cre-
dit on different terms. The borrowers, therefore, have various alter-
natives. 
1. Commercial Banks 
The banking institutions are at the center of the entire network 
of the financial structure. They are divided into two groups: (a) 
clearing banks and (b) Scottish banks. These banks are connected with 
the Bank of England via the Discount houses. 
Clearing Banks 
Clearing banks are predominant in the commercial banking system 
of England. They deal mainly with the current accounts. Accordingly, 
their lending policy is confined to the acquisition of highly liquid 
assets--an obvious preference for self-liquidating bills. An eight 
16 
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percent "cash ratio 11 --cash against deposit liabilities--is strictly 
maintained at the Bank of England. Banks also maintain traditionally 
a thirty percent 'liquidity ratio' in the form of money at call or at 
short notice to the discount market, treasury bills and commercial 
bills as a percentage of total deposits. This is the second line of 
defense which is also subject to the influence of the Bank of England. 
Because of this systematic arrangement of the liquid assets, British 
banks do not hold excess reserves like American banks. 
Scottish Banks 
The Scottish banks differ from the clearing banks in the follow-
ing respects. (1) They have the right of note-issue; (2) they have 
relatively higher proportion of time deposits to total deposits ; (3) 
rules for cash reserves do not apply to the Scottish banks. 
The domestic banking business of Scotland is hand]ed by the 
Scottish banks. Their day-to-day management is completely independent 
of the English barks, eventhough they are under the same central bank, 
i.e. the Bank of England. The most interesting point about the Scottish 
banks is that they have the right of note-issue, which clearing banks 
do not have. Fixed fiduciary system is adopted as the basis of note-
issue, the limit being fixed at f;_ . 2.7 million. The issue over the limit 
of t 2.7 million is permitted against holding of one hundred percent 
of Bank of England notes. 1 So, the Bank of England has adequate control 
over the Scottish banks. Scottish banks have a relatively higher 
1committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Report (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1959), P• 54. 
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proportion of time deposits to total deposits and consequently, a higher 
proportion of investment to total deposits. In 1958, the ratio of time 
deposits to total deposits was 53 percent and that of investment to 
total deposits was 45 percent. The respective ratios in English banks 
were 39 percent and 30 percent. 2 
Rules for cash reserves which apply to English banks, do not apply 
to Scottish banks. They do not publish any statement concerning the 
policy or methods. One gets the impression from this analysis that the 
Scottish banks are a weak link of the financial structure of the United 
Kingdom which is ve~y difficult to manage by the Bank of England. The 
business of the Scottish banks is relatively small. The Radcliffe 
Report has concluded that these banks have comparatively small weight 
in the total credit structure of the United Kingdom. Moreover , they 
follow cautious banking policies in their lending operations.3 
Discount Market 
The discount market is the distinct feature of the United Kindom's 
financial structure. It deals with the purchase and sale of treasury 
bills and bills of exchange, guaranteed by the acceptance houses, and 
provides liquidity to the creditors of the bills. The discount houses 
borrow funds from the clearing banks. These loans constitute very 
important liquid assets for the banks. When the banks call their loans , 
the discount houses can use their privilege of rediscounting with the 
Bank of England. It is worth noting that this facility of rediscount-
ing at the Ba:nk is not granted to any other financial institution. 
2Ibid., P• 55. 3Ibid., P• 54. 
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Through its relation with the discount market , t he Bank of England has 
effective control over discount rates , i.e., t he cost of credit. The 
di scount market stands as a buffer between the commercial banks and the 
Bank of England. 
2. Non-bank Financial Institutions 
Acceptance hous es act as intermediary institutions between lenders 
and borrowers in the private sector. The bills guaranteed by them are 
highly liquid and eligible for rediscounting at the Bank of England. 
Issuing houses play the same role for public companies in raising long-
term capital. Hire-purchase and financial houses are the source of 
consumer credit. Most of them are closely linked with the commercial 
banks in the sense that they borrow their funds from these financial 
houses. Insurance companies as well as super-annuation and pension 
funds have vast resources at their disposal which they invest for vari-
ous business projects. On the whole these non-bank financial institu-
tions add to the liquidity of the economy to a great extent. But they 
are not under the direct control of the Bank of England. Indirect ef-
fects of any measure are proved to be too small to serve any purpose. 
Consequently, when the Bank pursues a restrictive policy for the com-
mercial banks, they approach the other institutions, and ultimately it 
b~comes difficult to control the supply of money and credit. 4 
B. General Credit Controls 
1. Bank-Rate 
In the credit control operations of the Bank of England, the dis-
count rate has been the main instrument. By changing the bank-rate 
4Ibid., P• 107-109. 
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the Bank of England can affect the entire structure of interest rates. 
Open market operations, too, are used to facilitate and make effective 
bank-rate policy. However, according to the Radclif'.fe Committee, the 
experience of the United Kingdom during and after the Second World War 
was that neither borrowers nor lenders seemed to be considerably influ-
enced by the changes in interest rates. The Radcliffe Committee Report 
analyzed both the interest incentive and liquidity incentive effects 
of changes in the rate of interest and came to that conclusion.5 In 
the word$ of Sir Oliver Franks, "While the pressure of ·i!!terest rates, 
particularly if spread through the whole structure from short-term to 
long-term rates, was real, it was also gradual and not very large. 11 6 
2. Open Market Operations 
The function of open market operations in the 'United Kingdom is 
regulating the securities market rather than monetary management. 
As mentioned before in this chapter, they are used to facilitate changes 
in the interest rate structure by influencing the yields and prices in 
the gilt-edged market as well as t~e mon~y supply. 
Traditionally the bank~rate has been the most used instrument of 
credit control in Britain. And that, too, has become less effective 
in the present complex financial structure. 
It is obvious that to make monetary policy more effective, apart 
from considering the aspects of the quantity and cost of money and ere-
dit ~ aggregate (demand aspects), emphasis has to be laid on its 
5Ibid., p. 129-134. 
6sir Oliver Franks, Some Reflections£!! Monetary Policy (Asia 
Publishing House, 1960), p. 34~35. 
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availability (on the supply side) and distributive aspects simultane-
ously, hence, the significance of the direct instruments of credit 
control in the United Kingdom. 
c. Selective Credit Controls 
In making a systematic review of the experience in .the use of the 
' i· 
selective credit controls, this study has been confined to the experience 
after the Second World War. Capital Issues Control, .Moral Suasion, and 
Hire-purchase Control were widely used selecti~e credit controls in 
~ 
the United Kingdom. 
1. Control of Capital Issues 
During the war, the government issued regulations for new capital 
issues, bank advances, and other forms of borrowing. A Capital Issue 
Committee (CIC) was created to advise the treasury on the task of ap-
proving or rejecting applications for borrowing. The treasury via the 
Bank of England then passed its judgement to the banks. These wartime 
regulations were continued in the Borrowing (control and guarantees) 
Act of 1946. All requests for bank borrowing in excess of E 50,000 ·~ 
( f 10,000 during March-~uly 1958) were referred to the CIC. The pur-
pose was to check speculative tendencies as well .as to allocate the 
available bank funds in conformity with existing priorities. Defense 
and export considerations were given foremost priorities. In the 
United Kingdom banks traditionally respect the wishes of the Bank of 
England. So the existence of this control itself served to eliminate 
some applications,. e.g., the banks did not foreward those applications 
to the CIC for further scrutiny which they did not consider to be in 
conformity with the established instructions from the Bank of England. 
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In practice, therefore, "it has never been a control of investment, but 
purely a control of the raising of larger sums. 11 7 However, CIC's opera-
tions in particular and capital issues control in general were criticized 
severely. 
Capital issues control was the control over the issues for fixed 
capital purposes. There was no control on internally fina,nc; c;;d invest-
ment. There was also no control on borrowing for working capital. These 
exemptions were quite important as pretexts to raise the necessary capi-
tal and to circumvent the spirit of capital issue control. "Further, 
until about 1955 private firms were unusually liquid and quite able to 
finance considerable investment internally without recourse to the new-
issues market. 118 Moreover, the control did not apply to the public 
sector's borrowing program which was quite substantial. Thus capital 
issue control was half-hearted and loose. 
The CIC acted only in an advisory capacity to the treasury, i.e., 
it evaluated the applications for new issues and recommended approval 
or rejection to the treasury. But sometimes the recommendations of the 
CIC were not approved by the treasury. This created anomaly and raised 
the question whether the Commission should be dissolved.9 
The CIC was also criticized for red-tapism and delay in consider-
ing the applications. "While in a number of cases the Committee 
?committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Report (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1959), P• 150. 
8H. J. Plous, "Control of Capital Issues in the United Kingdom," 
Jo\U'nal of Finance, XIII (1958), p. 357. 
9committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Minutes of Evidence 
London, H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 80. 
refused permission for issues, in others similar ones were sanctioned. 
The working of the Capital Issues Committee, therefore, gave rise to 
numerous complaints and tended to discredit the idea of controlling 
investment altogether. 1110 
Looking at all this criticism it seems that the major objection 
was against the administration of the CIC rather than against the 
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principles behind the Capital Issue Control. The underlying theoretical 
ground for the control was that savings of the economy were not suffi-
cient to finance at the existing rates of interest the desired volume 
of investment • .And so the CIC should "filter" the applications for 
new capital issues to channel the capital resources in established 
priorities. The Capital Issue Committee was terminated in 1959. After 
that, informal and voluntary consultation with the Bank of England con-
tinued in the case of large domestic issues. With respect to issues by 
foreign borrowers, stricter restrictions still operate. Similar control 
of capital issues was applied during the immediate post-war years in 
Australia, Norway, France, and Belgium for similar purposes. The 
general impression is that it has proved helpful.11 
2. Moral Suasion 
.Another attempt in the application of the Selective Credit Control 
was in the form of directives and requests from the Bank of England to 
the commercial banks (clearing banks) for specific actions. The focal 
lOThomas Balogh, Tqe Principal Memoranda Q.t. Evidence, The 
Committee on the Working of the Monetary System (London, H.M.S. O. 
1960), Volume III, P• 38. 
llF. B. Tamgna, "Process and Instrument of Monetary Policy : A 
Comparative Analysis, 11 Monetary Management (Commission on Money and 
Credit, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1963) p. 147-150 
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point of these directives was the bank advances. The banks were 
instructed not to grant advances for speculative purposes but to give 
priority for the purpose of improving productive efficiency in general. 
It is of interest to note here the experience of the "forced fundings" 
of 1951-1952. The immediate purpose was to reduce the banks' liquidity 
ratio to the traditional level of JO percent (it was 39 percent at that 
time). The higher ratio was due to the glut of treasury bills. The 
Bank of England requested the banks and other institutions to convert 
some of their treasury bills into non-liquid gilt-edged assets which 
matured after one, two, or three years. Treasury bills worthf--l,000 
million were converted by this "forced funding". When the first series 
was ready for maturity in October, 1952, the Bank of England again 
employed Moral Suasion and came out with another "forced funding" 
operation. After that, "forced funding" was not used. "Forced funding" 
was forceful and effective in controlling the excessive liquidity at 
that time. 
The second experience of the use of this instrument was in February, 
1952, when the Bank of England called upon the banks and acceptance 
houses to reduce the maximum credit period from 120 days to 90 days 
for commercial bills financing internal trade. From time to time such 
directives and requests were co-ordinated with discount rate changes. 
The balance-of-payments situatio~ as well as the domestic economic 
climate were taken into account in determining the degree of "credit 
squeeze" requested of the banks. 
In September, 1957, Bank- r ate was raised from five percent to seven 
percent. At the same time, banks were r equested to maintain the level 
of advances at the average level for the preceeding twelve months. It 
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seems that the banks were quite loyal in following the instructions from 
the Bank of England. and this was really an important factor in holding 
down bank advances during early post-war years. 
J. Hire-Purchase Credit Control 
As a source of consumer credit. hire-purchase occupies a much more 
prominent position than the other sources. such as credit account. bank 
overdrafts. etc. 
The significance of hire-purchase finance in the financial structure 
of the United Kingdom is that it is a convenient source of medium -term 
credit on fixed terms for the purchase of equipment. Here the equipment 
itself provides the security for the loan. which can be paid off by 
regular installments. 
The direct regulation over hire-purchase credit terms was first 
introduced in 1941 with other price control regulations. The purpose 
was to depress the sales of particular goods required for defence or for 
export. The banks were asked to restrict their lending to finance houses 
and other institutions active in hire-purchase financing. Limits were 
also determined for minimum down payments and maximum periods of repay-
ment. In 1952. the Board of Trade was authorized to administer the 
hire-purchase controls. This attempt to utilize the authority of the 
Board of Trade to restrict credit is comparable to the Regulation "W" 
of the Federal Reserve System in the United States. During 1952-1954, 
the purpose was to control the pressure of internal demand on production 
capacity and to spare it for export. Later on. hire-purchase controls 
were extended to cover a wide variety of capital goods also. 
The Radcliffe Connnittee Report has observed that the changes in 
interest rates and restriction on the amount of lending to the hire-
purchase finance houses by the banks did not prove very fruitful in 
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controlling total pressure of demand for goods. Because of the existence 
of alternative institutions, the pressure of demand for durable consumer 
goods was diverted from the banks to these institutions and the purpose 
of the controls was not served fully. 
Changes in the terms of hire-purchase controls have proved more 
effective than the absolute restrictions on the amount of hire-purchase 
finance. The reason, according to the Radcliffe Report, is that con-
sumers react by decreasing their purchases when any distur.bance in 
their steady weekly or monthly installments is caused by the change in 
the terms of hire-purchase. The assumption underlying is that the con-
sumers habitually keep aside a certain part of their fixed income for 
hire-purchases. 
Very strong opinion was expressed by some of the witnesses before 
the Radcliffe Committee that the effects of the change in the terms of 
the hire-purchase controls are not permanent. If there is an increase 
in the minimum down payments consumers have to save more in order to 
pay for it. Consequently, purchases decline for a while. But gradually 
people accumulate deposits and get accustomed to the new state of affairs, 
then the temporary decline in purchases is nullified. 12 If the time of 
the repayment is shortened, i.e., if the installment payments are made 
higher, the declining effect might be permanent according to those wit-
nesses. 
During 1956 , total hire-purchase debt was decreased fromt4,95 to 
t 405 million. In February, 1956, hire-purchase controls were extended 
to industrial and farm equipment and such debt fell fromt70 million to 
12committee on the Working of the Monetary System: Minutes of 
Evidence (London, H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 242 
..... , 
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~ 50 million during the year. 13 During the latter part of 1958, the con-
trols on some of the items were removed. The rise in the sale of those 
items was marked immediately. 
So far as the growth of the hire-purchase companies during this 
period is concerned, the results are not very commendable. CIC had to 
scrutinize the applications from hire-purchase companies. Since there 
was no control over reserves, finance companies could manage to expand 
their size and scope of business by ploughing back their profits. The 
other noticable factor was the emergence of many small companies as 
there was no .control over the issues of less thant 50,000. Moreover, 
hire-purchase companies could successfully manage to get the needed 
finance from non-bank financial institutions which were not directly 
affected by the controls. 
Apart from the criticism of the hire-purchase controls from various 
angles, the general conclusion is that they were considerably effective. 
"A restriction of consumer credit, ••• has importance as imposing an 
immediate reduction in the sales receipts of manufactures, just at a 
time when they would be encountering acute difficulty in borrowing. It 
is a once-for-all effect, but this is appropriate to our present pur-
pose.1114 Controls were removed completely in 1958 as inflationary 
pressures subsided. 
13cornmittee on the Working of the Monetary System: Report 
(London, H.M.S.O., 1959), P• 165. 
14Ibid, p. 188. 
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In 1961, the controls were again applied more on a general request 
base rather than on a specific regulations base. This time the Bank of 
England extended the same requests to the Insurance Companies Association 
and Finance Houses. 15 This is the first effort to extend the monetary 
policy to the financial institutions other than the banks. In France 
such controls were extended to the dealers and distributors that were 
not refinanced by the banks. 
4. General Remarks 
Selective Credit Controls were used quite extensively and for a 
long time in the United Kingdom. Unlike the United States there is no 
objection to selective credit controls on the ground of undue interference 
in the mechanism of free-enterprise economy. Probably this is the reflec-
tion of the strong influence of a socialistic ideology prevailing in the 
United Kingdom. Another factor responsible for the extensive use of 
selective credit controls is the nature of the post-war problems which 
the United Kingdom had to face. With the increasing strain of inflationary 
pressures and the balance-of-payments difficulties during post-war years, 
the Bank of England became firm in checking those tendencies by any 
means. Selective credit controls were an example of this determination. 
Lastly, because of the peculiar banking structure of the United Kingdom, 
where "Big Five1l16were dominant, it was comparatively easy for the Bank 
of England to direct the banks to follow particular policy in bank 
advances and to administer the selective credit controls, whereas it is 
very difficult for the Federal Reserve System in the United States to do 
so because there are thousands of banks quite independent of each other . 
l5F. B. Tamagna, "Process and Instrument of Monetary Policy: A 
Comparative ·Analysis", Monetary Management (Commission on Money and 
Credit, Prentice- Hall, New Jersey, 1963), p. 152-153· 
1611Big Five" are the dominant clearing banks of Barclays, Lioyds, 
the Midland, the National Provincial and the Westminister 
CHAPTER IV 
UNITED STATES OF .AMERICA 
A. Financial Structure 
1. Commercial Banks 
The financial structure of the United States, like England, is 
composed of the banking system as well as specialized non-bank finan-
cial intermediaries. As Sayers has remarked, the banking system of 
the United States is the same as that of the United Kingdom, so far 
as the basic principles are concerned, but it is very different in 
form. 1 Instead of branch banking as in the United Kingdom, the United 
States has a ''unit II type of banking system. There are more than 14, 000 
commercial banks. 
The commercial banks hold demand and time deposits. Compared to 
the United Kingdom, the 11savings11 aspect of deposits is considered more 
important here. Apart from medium-term and mortgage loans, consumer 
credit business is very important. Sizable investment in short-term 
and medium-term government securities as in the United Kingdom is the 
characteristic of the banks' balance-sheet. In 1959 government securi-
ties comprised 31 percent of the assets of commercial banks. 2 
1R. S. Sayers, American Banking System-! Sketch (Claredon Press, 
Oxford, 1949), p. iii. 
2Commission on Money and Cr~dit, The Commercial Banking Industry 
(Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1962), p. 135. 
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More than 50 percent of the commercial banks in the United States 
are not members of the Federal Reserve System. These non-member banks 
are regulated by state legislation. They hold a very small portion of 
the total assets and liabilities of all commercial banks. Their im-
portance, therefore, for monetary management is very negligible.3 
Inter-bank deposit business is a striking peculiarity of the United 
States' banking structure. This correspondent relationship is used to 
facilitate clearing of checks and remittance business. In a way, this 
is a substitute for branch banking where the funds could be pooled to-
gether. II . . . it is a network linking practically all b~~s in the 
country directly or indirectly to the great New York banks. 114 
Both in the United Kingdom and the United States, the commercial 
banks have shown an obvious preference for short-term lending, i.e., 
they appear to be influenced by the commercial loan theory. But banks 
have suffered inadequacy of markets on that base and consequently they 
have broadened their lending perspectives.5 Term loans and consumer 
credit loans are important developments in their lending policy. Con-
sumer credit, as in the United Kingdom, is granted directly to the 
consumer or through financing for specialized finance companies and 
~ales organizations which do the final lending to the consumers. Thus, 
the banking system is closely linked with the non-bank financial inter-
mediaries. 
)Clark Warburton, "Non-member Banks and the Effectiveness of Mone-
tary Policy," Monetary Management (Commission on Money and Credit, 
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1963), p. 329-331. 
4R. S. Sayers, American Banking System-! Sketch (Claredon Press, 
Oxford, 1949), P• 5. 
5R. S. Sayers, Modern Banking (Claredon Press, Oxford, Fourth Edi-
tion, 1958), p. 262. 
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"American banking institutions serve a wide variety of credit needs 
and have shown remarkable ingenuity in designing new financing techniques 
for the effective use of credit. 11 6 
2. Non-bank Financial Institutions 
A part of the demand for credit in the economy has also been met 
by specialized financial institutions. Their significance in the mone-
tary system lies in the provision of ''near moneys ,'1 bearing liquidity 
of different degrees. That is, the assets of these institutions can 
be easily converted in money. 
Mutual savings banks do not have capital. They lend only from 
their deposit funds and follow very cautious lending policy. Savings 
and loan associations lend also on real estate loans. Ten percent of 
their assets are held in government securities. Their liquidity is 
increased by the secondary market for mortgages. 
On the other hand, investment banks receive no deposits. They 
underwrite the issues of the firms and sell the securities or stocks 
to provide long-term capital for these firms. Commercial paperhouses 
sell short-term obligations of large businesses. The borrowers find 
this type of borrowing more convenient because they can raise the re-
quired capital by a single line of credit which is not possible by bor-
rowing from banks. Life insurance companies are the largest single 
class of savings depositories. They invest in mortgages, corporation 
bonds, and government securities. Credit unions and consumers' finance 
companies operate in the field of consumer finance. Quite a few insti-
tutions work in the field of providing finance for housing and construction 
6r. Brooke Willis, "United States," Banking ~stems , ed. B. H. 
Beckhart (Columbia University Press, New York, 195 ), p. 909. 
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and agriculture. Some of them provide a national market for mortgages 
and add to the liquidity of the system. In both the fields of agricul-
ture and housing, government credit plays an important role either 
through subsidy or guarantee. Stocks and security exchanges facilitate 
trading in issues and thereby add liquidity to the system. The funds 
can be raised easily in the continuous market for securities. 
The Federal Reserve System has no direct control over the lending 
operations of these institutions, though the indirect effect of any 
policy measure does exist to a certain extent. The experience of the 
post-war years indicates that the increase in money-substitutes by these 
institutions has decreased the aggregate demand for money balances and 
hence increased the velocity of money. There is disagreement as to how 
far the relative importance of the velocity goes and whether any direct 
control is needed or not.7 
The Commission of Money and Credit concludes that the case for 
direct control over these non-bank institutions is not strong. "Their 
contribution to cyclical changes in velocity appears to be too small 
to warrent such an extension. 118 The Radcliffe Report has different ob-
servations in this case. Their conclusion is that non-bank financial 
intermediaries do set the limitations in the effectiveness of the mone-
tary policy. Anyway, as Goldenweiser has remarked, the problem of co-
ordination of their policies with the policy of the Federal Reserve 
System has been important.9 
?commission on Money and Credit, Mo1ey and Credit, Their Influence ~ Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Prentice-Ha 1, New Jersey, "f§'DT"Y, p. 80. 
8Ibid., P• 80. 
9E. A. Goldenweiser, Monetary Management (McGraw Hill Book Co., 
New York, 1949), p. 40. 
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B. General Credit Controls 
In contrast to the single central banking institution, like 
Britain and many other countries, there is a peculiar structure of 
Federal Reserve Banks under the Board of Governors. However, credit 
control operations are highly centralized. 
1. Bank-Rate 
The bank-rate is less effective in America because member banks 
generally do not prefer to borrow from the Federal Reserve System. 
Borrowing from the Federal Reserve System is direct--not through the 
discount market as in England--but it is regarded as a privilege rather 
than a right. Continuous and substantial borrowing by the banks in 
normal conditions is always discouraged by the Federal Reserve System. 
So, the banks have formed the habit of maintaining excess reserves. 
2. Open Market Operations 
The buying and selling of government securities by the Federal 
Reserve System affects the reserves of the commercial banks and there-
fore, the money supply. When the Federal Reserve banks buy securities, 
reserves of the member banks are increased by the amount of the purchase . 
The increased reserves increase the lending capacity of the banks and 
also leads to the expansion in money supply. The sale of government 
securities similarly will reduce the lending capacity of the banks. 
Open market operations, thus, finally affect the capacity of the banks 
to increase their earning assets and demand deposits. "Open market opera-
tions constitute the primary instrument of monetary control. 11 10 From 
1953 to 1960 the policy of ''bills only" was followed. The key feature 
10connnission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence 
£!! Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Prentice-tlall, New Jersey, 19bf'f,° p. 62. 
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was that open market operations for the purpose of stabilization were 
confined to short-term securities--chiefly treasury bills. It was ex-
pected that the bill market operations would initiate changes in the 
interest rate levels of the short-term market without creating disturb-
ing shocks to the long-term bond market. Actually, ''bills only'' policy 
could not bring the gain in ''depth, breadth and resiliency" of the long-
term market. In early 1961, this policy was altered to a more flexible 
one which permitted operations in all maturity ranges of the United 
States government securities market. The reason for this change was 
the emergence of serious balance of payments deficits. The Commission 
on Money and Credit, as well as the Radcliffe Commission, had recommended 
that open market operations should deal in securities with all maturities. 
3. Changes in Reserve Requirements 
By the Banking Act of 1935 the Federal Reserve System has the 
powers to vary the reserve requirements of the member banks. By the 
Act of 1959 the country banks are required to keep the reserves between 
7 percent and 14 percent on net demand deposits. The limits between 
10 percent and 22 percent are fixed up for all other banks. On time 
deposits the limits for all member banks are between 3 and 6 percent. 
A change in the reserve requirements influences the lending ca-
pacity of the banks by changing the reserves of the banks. In other 
words, the rise in the legal reserves ratio will increase the amount 
of required reserves which banks must maintain. This will result in 
the shrinking of legal excess reserves. Consequently, the credit 
creating capacity of the banks will be reduced. The fall in the legal 
reserves ratio, similarly, will increase the excess reserves of the banks, 
thereby increasing their credit creating capacity. 
35 
In the United States the discount rate and open market operations 
were used quite extensively in the past, whereas reserve requirement 
changes have been used sparingly. Frequent use of the changes in the 
reserve requirements as an instrument of credit control is not favored 
by the Commission on Money and Credit, on the ground that this instru-
ment is "awkward and cumbersome" and "less finely adjustable" in com-
parison with open market operations.11 
C. Selective Credit Controls 
The use of selective credit controls has been confined to regu-
lating margins required for dealings in registered securities and con-
sumer credit. 
1. Margin Requirements 
The instrument of margin requirements known as Regulation "T" 
was introduced by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Federal 
Reserve System was supposed to administer the regulation. The Act was 
aimed at regulating credit used for excessive stock speculation, which 
was thought to be a destabilizing influence in the economy. In other 
words, margin requirements limit the amount which banks may lend and 
customers may borrow in order to purchase or carry securities . Tech-
nically, margin is that part of the price of a security which the pur-
chaser is called upon to provide in cash. The amount that can be bor-
rowed is, therefore, limited by the difference between the price and 
llcommission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit, Their Influence 
.Qll Jobs, Prices, !!lS. Growth (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1961), Po 67 . 
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the prescribed margin. The greater the margin requirements, the more 
restrictive the borrowing will be. 
Excessive stock speculation bids up stock market prices and leads 
to the relative overflow of money and credit in the stock market. This 
may become dangerous to the economic stability. It might be recalled 
that the Great Depression was marked and accentuated with the sudden 
stock market crash. It is necessary, therefore, to control the violent 
fluctuations in the stock market credit advances of the banks. Margin 
requirements, by varying the margins required against the securities, 
aim to regulate the bank credit used for stock market transactions. 
General credit situation of the economy and ~he direction or level of 
stock prices are taken into account when making changes in margin re-
quirements. 
Margin requirements have been varied from time to time over a range 
from 25 percent to 100 percent. It was not necessary to use this in-
strument extensively before the Second World War. However , "during 
1945, the Board made considerable use of this new weapon with impres-
sive results. 1112 In 1946 the margins were raised to 100 percent to 
prevent excessive speculation in the stock market. "To require a mar-
gin of 100 percent was in effect to forbid loans for the purpose in ques-
tion.1113 In 1951 the margins were determined at 75 percent in view of 
the general inflationary situation. In February 1953 they were reduced 
to 50 percent. With the revival of the inflationary pressures, margin 
12~. s. Sayers, American Banking System-! Sketch (Claredon Press, 
Oxford, 1949), P• 99. 
13Board of the Govenors of the , Federal Reserve System, The Federal 
Reserve System-Its . Purposes~ Functions (Washington, DoCo, 1947), Po 4u o 
37 
requirements were raised to 70 percent in April, 1955. With persistent 
inflationary tendencies and a stock market boom, margin requirements 
were maintained at a highlevel. 1958 was the period of depression. 
The Federal Reserve System adopted an easy money policy. Along with 
several other measures margin requirements were reduced to 50 percent in 
January, 1958. These deflationary tendencies disappeared within a short 
time. The Federal Reserve System revived the tight money policy. Mar-
gin requirements were raised to 70 percent in August, 1958, and to 90 
percent in October, 1958. With little monetary ease in July, 1960, 
margin requirements were reduced to 70 percent. Since then margin re-
quirements are maintained within the range of 50 percent to 70 percent. 
This brief account of the changes in the margin requirements during 
the post-war years indicates that the fluctuations in the general price 
level along with the fluctuations in the stock market prices necessitate 
changes in the margin requirements in the same direction. In times of 
price-rise margin requirements are raised. It is claimed that the mar-
gin requirements successfully restrict the pyramiding of loans that 
takes place without adequate securities during boom conditions~4 •Pyra-
mid~ refers to the bank holdings of the traders dealing in securities. 
During boom conditions, they go on adding their balances by borrowing 
against the additional market value of securities already held in their 
account without additional securities. 
"By the control of margin requirements excessive use of credit in 
the stock market, which has caused serious disturbances t o the economy 
14a. A. Young, "Tools and Process of Monetary Policy," United States 
Monetary Policy (American Assembly, Columbia University, 1958) , p. JO. 
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in the past, has been placed under control. ul.5 This was written by the 
Board of Governors in 1947 and it is equally true today. 
2. Real Estate Credit Control 
Real estate credit control was introduced in 1950 in the form of 
Regulation ''X". It applied to persons who were engaged in the business 
of extending real estate credit for residential purposes. The control 
prescribed maximum loan values, maximum maturities, and minimum amor-
tiza tion terms. 
The basis of the real estate credit control and consumer credit 
control was the same--to check inflationary tendencies in those fields. 
The arguments for and against both of the controls are similar in nature. 
Detailed discussion of these arguments is done in the section of consumer 
credit control. 
3. Consumer Credit Control 
The expansion of consumer credit has made a major contribution to 
the national economic development. It has enabled the growth of the 
automobile industry and other industries making durable goods. It has 
also enabled the consumers to buy and own costly durable goods with 
their limited income by the schemes of minimum down payment and long 
drawn out periods of repayment. But a group of economists have always 
doubted about 11 the ethics of granting loans" to consumers by banks on 
the ground that these are the loans for non-productive purposes and are 
l.5Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Reserve Sys5e)-Its Purposes and Functions (Washington, D.C., Edition, 19 7, p. 42. 
The Federal 
Second 
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not sound commercial banking practices. 16 During the Great Depression 
and thereafter, the focus of the criticism against consumer credit loans 
has shifted to their unstabilizing characteristics. 
Empirical observation is that the output and purchases of consumer 
durable goods fluctuate widely.17 Consequently, this leads to the ex-
pansion and contraction of consumer credit and accentuates unstability. 
Thus, as a source of unstability, the fluctuations in consumer credit 
may be reflected in the violent disturbances in the volume of total 
credit, savings, investment, and growth. On this ground consumer credit 
controls are advocated. 
Direct control of consumer credit in the United Kingdom and the 
United States is advocated on the ground that the general credit con-
trol has proved less effective in controlling the consumer credit. 
This is evidenced from time to time in the United States. 1953-1956 
was the period of general credit restraint and even then consumer credit 
loans from the banks expanded sharply,18 as shown in the table on the 
following page. Easy shiftability of increased cost provides the ex-
planation for the lack of effectiveness of general credit controls in 
controlling the consumer credit • 
. 16consumer Installment Credit: Conference .£!:. Regulation, P;:irt. II, 
Volume I (National Bureau of Economic Rese~rch, Washington, D.C., 1957), 
P• XVII. 
17.1ilton Friedman, "Consumer Credit Control As An Instrument of 
Stabilization Policy," Money and Economic Activity, ed. L. S. Ritter 
(Houghton Miffin Company, Boston, 1961), p. 198. 
l8consumer Installment Credit-Conference.£!:. Regulation, Part II, 
Volume 2 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, D.C., 1957) , 
p. 4. 
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TABLE I 
CONSUMER CREDIT FROM COMMERCIAL BANKS, 
IN U.S.A. 1952-1956 
(Short-intermediate Term) 
End of the Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Installment Credit from Cornmercial 
Banks (in millions of dollars) 
$ 7.524 
8,998 
8, 796 
10, 601 
11 , 777 
Source: Business Statistics, 1963 Biennial Edition 
United States Department Of Commerce, Office 
of Business Economies, p. 91. 
Consumer credit control, known as Regulation ''W'', was introduced 
in the United States during 1941 as a war time measure. With few in-
tervals of termination, it was continued up to 1952. It has been sus-
pended since then. 
Three characteristics could be mentioned for the consumer credit 
controls as they were applied jn the United States. (1) Control over 
the volume of consumer credit was exercised by establishing minimum 
down payments and maximum periods of repayment. When the authorities 
wanted to tighten.,up the control, the amount of minimum down payments 
was increased and the number of installments for repayment was decreased. 
(2) The provisions varied for different types of goods and were subject 
to modifications. (3) Both sellers of consumer goods and lenders of 
cash to consumers were subject to regulation. 
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Consumer credit controls are probably the most controversial selec-
tive credit control applied in the United States. Many economists do 
agree that consumer credit is a source of instability. But, they do 
not agree that stand-by controls would serve the purpose. SUch controls 
may suppress the inflation for a while but they can not cure it by re-
moving its causes. On this line of reasoning stand-by controls will 
increase the difficulty of attaining and maintaining economic stability. 
The Commission on Money and Credit was not in favor of advocating stand-
by controls because of the probable administrative difficulties. 
Friedman has analyzed consumer credit control and concluded that 
it is a "technically defective stabilization device. nl9 He compared 
the effects of consumer credit controls with those of a uniform excise 
tax and considered consumer credit controls as a heavier tax which is 
regressive in effects. Lower income people are mainly the credit pur-
chasers on whom consumer credit control hits hard, while those higher 
income people who prefer to be cash purchasers are not affected by the 
controls. Consumer credit control is, therefore, a discriminatory tax. 
His ultimate conclusion is that the uniform excise tax is technically 
preferable to the consumer credit control for stabilization purposes . 
~oreover, these controls are undue government interference on the free-
dom of consumers. "As I evaluate the balance sheet, the advantages of 
either consumer credit controls itself ••• seem dubious and minor ; 
the disadvantages, clear and significant.,eo 
19 Milton Friedman, "Consumer Credit Control As An Instrument of 
Stabilization Policy," Money and Economic Activity, ed. L. s. Ritter 
(Houghton Miffin Company, Boston, 1961), p. 195-216. 
20ibid., p. 216. 
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A second argument against the consumer credit controls is that 
they restrict expenditure by dampening demand for credit for a particu-
lar purpose rather than by decreasing the supply of credit. Consequently, 
the supply of credit available will probably depress interest rates and 
this may stimulate non-consumption expenditure again aggrevating in-
stability. 
The third important criticism is that consumer credit control af-
fects the growth of the industry in question and hence interferes with 
the pattern of resource allocation against them. "The existence and 
use of ••• consumer credit controls tends in the long run to make 
industries affected by such controls less attractive to producers and 
thus to reduce the fraction of resources devoted to them. 11 21 From 
Table II, on the following page, it is seen that over the last 25 years 
the price rise in the durable consumer goods is relatively less. It 
may be considered as a sign of relative progressiveness of these indus-
tries. Consumer credit controls therefore are an unjustified punishment 
for these industries. Really speaking, it is very difficult to prove 
the relative progressiveness of the industries affected by the consumer 
credit controls. It is equally difficult to prove that the controls 
interfere with the pattern of resource allocation. The essence of all 
these criticisms is the positive tendency towards the faith in free 
market mechanism without any sort of direct interference. 
It is interesting to note some contrary remarks in this connection. 
The Federal Reserve System had submitted a statement before the House 
Banking and Currency Committee in May 1951, wherein it urged continuance 
21Ibid., P• 209. 
TABLE II 
ALL COMMODITIES-RETAIL PRICE INDEX 
IN U.S.A. 1940-1960 
(1957-59 = 100) 
Year Durables Nondurables 
1940 
1950 
1960 
51. 3 
94.2 
100. 7 
44.3 
85.9 
101. 9 
Source: Business Statistics, 1963 Biennial 
Edition (United States Department of 
Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1963), 
P• 38. 
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of Regulation "W.'~ "While consumer credit regulation alone cannot solve 
the problem of inflation, nevertheless, Regulation ''W~' by establishing 
minimum down payment requirements and maximum periods for repayment of 
consumer installment debt, has effectively limited the expansion of 
consumer purchasing power in the form of credit dollars and is an es-
sential part of any continuing comprehensive anti-inflationary program. 1122 
Again in a letter submitted to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 
as well as to the House Banking and Currency Committee, the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System wrote, "We have 
said, and we believe, that it is a desirable, supplementary measure of 
credit restraint in a time of inflationary danger. 1123 Thus , it seems 
that official monetary authorities favored the continuation of the con-
sumer credit controls during the prevailing inflationary situation. 
22
~ederal Reserve Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), May, 1951, p. 491. 
23Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), July, 1951, p. 750. 
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It is apparent from the pros and cons for consumer credit controls 
discussed here that different criteria are applied for judging these 
controls. Consequently, opinions vary widely. 
4. General Remarks 
Consumer credit controls, in particular, and selective credit 
controls, in general, are resented in the United States on the ground 
that they are not equitible and consistent with the basic principles 
of the free enterprise economy. The cry for maintaining a free enter-
prise economy in the United States is so strong that any effort of 
direct regulation is suspected to be an interference in the free socio-
economic life of the nation. "The continuance at all of the qualitative 
controls is a source of extreme disappointment to one who believes the 
market is a superior device for the organization of economic affairs. 11 24 
At the same time it seems that the United States has a deep faith in the 
efficacy of the general credit control. This is reflected in the survey 
of consumer installment credit conducted by the Federal Reserve System. 
"There is a general feeling that present monetary measures do have an 
effect on installment credit ••• The combination of general monetary 
measures and these self-regulating factors permits adequate protection 
against excessive and dangerous movements in installment credit. 11 25 
Lastly, probable administrative problems are pinpointed in the United 
States against the selective credit controls over almost 14,000 banks 
241. w. Mints, "Discussion on Monetary Policy, 11 American Economic 
Review, May, 1953, Volume 43, Number 2, p. 54. 
25consumer Installment Credit, Part III (United States Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1957), P• 5.,. 
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quite independent of each other. The Commission on Money and Credit 
has not favored "stand-bY'·' controls on this ground. 
CHAPTER V 
INDIA 
A. Financial Structure 
1. Unorganized Money Market 
The financial structure of India is quite different from that of 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Currency is the major com-
ponent of the money supply. At the end of March, 1951, currency composed 
67.2 percent of the money supply. At the end of March, 1961, it was 
69 percent. 1 "This sets limitations on the extent to which monetary 
policy of the central banking authority can make itself felt. 112 The 
reason for this is that monetary policy works within a relatively small 
area of the economy where the banking sector operates. Barter still 
exists to some extent in some rural areas. Another characteristic 
of the money market in India is the existence of organized and unorgan-
ized sectors. The unorganized sector is not under the direct control 
of the Reserve Bank. Widely used credit instruments in the unorganized 
money market are different types of II hundis 1• ~ these being equivalent to 
internal bills of exchange. Village money lenders form the base of the 
unorganized structure. Like investment banks of the United States, they 
1Bhabatosh Datta, Essays in Plan Economics (World Press, Calcutta , 
1963), P• 177. ~ ~~ 
2H. R. Iengar , Monetary Policy and Economic Growth (Vora and Company . 
Bombay, 1962), P• 5. 
46 
47 
make loans for various purposes but do not receive deposits. Lending 
is based on mutual trust and transactions are seldom -written or wit-
nessed. Collateral is mostly land, houses, standing crops, or ornaments 
of gold and silver. The rate of interest charged is high and varies 
considerably according to time and place. Money lenders operate mostly 
in rural areas where modern financial institutions are not developed. 
They work on their own capital. Consequently, the Reserve Bank has not 
been able to control their credit operations. With the spread of bank-
ing facilities in rural areas, lending activities of the money lenders 
are diminishing rapidly. 
Indigenous bankers are the other important component in the unor-
ganized sector. They are prominent families who receive deposits and 
make loans. The reputation of the family name and the integrity asso-
ciated with the name is the reason underlying their ability to under-
take the business of receiving deposits and making loans. They are not, 
however, commercial bankers. Like money lenders, they also do non-
banking business like trading. Like money lenders, they also charge 
different rates of interest over time and places and customers. There 
is hardly a clear cut distinction between short-term and long-term 
finance. These weaknesses of the indigenous bankers are to some extent 
responsible for the lack of integrity and homogeneity in the money mar-
ket which is a "hindrance to the effective control policy of the Cen-
tral Bank. 11 3 
The Reserve Bank of India put foreward several schemes to bring 
the indigenous bankers under its control and to link them with the 
JH. N. Roy, The Role of Monetary Policy in Economic Development 
(World Press, Calcutta:-T9b2), p. 76. -
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orgainzed sector. None of these schemes was successful, mainly because 
the indigenous bankers were never willing to give up their non-banking 
business and also to submit their accounts to the Reserve Bank. It 
is obvious that the only hope lies in the development of alternative 
financial institutions in the rural areas; and these have been develop-
ing rapidly since 1955. 4 
2. Organized Money Market 
Commercial Banks 
The organized sector of the money market consists of commercial 
banks, the State Bank of India, co-operative banks, other financial 
institutions, and the Reserve Bank of India. 
The commercial banks in India are modeled after the British banks. 
They are divided into Indian scheduled banks, non-scheduled banks, and 
foreign scheduled banks.5 The division between scheduled and non-
scheduled banks is similar to that between member and non-member banks 
of the United States. According to the Banking Companies Act of 1949, 
a scheduled bank must have paid-up capital and reserves of not less than 
Rs. 500,000. At present, there are 89 scheduled banks and 256 non-
scheduled banks. 6 Non-scheduled banks are those which are not included 
in the Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank of India Act, because of the 
limitations of the size of capital and resources. They are the largest 
4As mentioned later in this chapter the State Bank of India has 
been assigned to develop banks in rural areas by the State Bank of India 
Act, 1955. 
5After passing of the Banking Companies Act of 1949, Foreign Scheduled 
banks are treated on a par with the Indian Scheduled banks. They do not 
have any distinguishable significance now. 
6Bhabatosh Datta, Essays in Plan Economics (World Press, Calcutta, 
1963), p. 152-179· 
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in number but are the least important from the view point of deposits 
and assets as shown in the table below. 
TABLE III 
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF SCHEDULED AND NON-SCHEDULED BANKS 
IN INDIA, MARCH, 1961 
Scheduled 
Non-scheduled 
Number of Banks Rupees in Millions 
89 
256 
17361 
480 
Source: Bhabatosh Datta,~ in Plan Economics (World 
Press, Calcutta, 1963), p. 179-180. 
Unlike scheduled banks, non-scheduled banks are not forced by law 
to keep their reserves with the Reserve Bank. They are not entitled 
to get credit accomodation from the Reserve Bank. After the Banking 
Companies Act of 1949 was passed, the number of non-scheduled banks 
steadily declined from 437 in 1953 to 256 in 1961.7 The Reserve Bank 
encouraged their merger with the scheduled banks. Seven major commer cial 
banks dominate the banking field by having a large number of off ices 
all over the country. 
Government Securities form 30 percent of the total assets of the 
commercial banks and they are the most important items in thei r asset 
structure. 
The discount market as it is developed in the United Kingdom and 
the United States i s not developed in India. Only in 1954 did t he 
Reserve Bank of India introduce a systematic scheme to develop the 
?Ibid., p. 180; and K. C. Chacko, The Monetary and Fi scal Policy 
f or India (Vora and Company, Bombay, 1957), p. 66. -
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bill market. There is no strong case for the establishment of discount 
houses on the London model, because borrowing by overdraft or against 
government securities or cash credit is more commonly used. The increas-
i ng portion of government securities i n the portfolios of the commercial 
banks has greatly added to the liquidity and elasticity of funds in the 
money market. On this ground, even i n the United Kingdom and the United 
States, the importance of discount bills is declining. 8 
The State Bank of India was formed in 1955 by nationalizing the 
Imperial Bank of India which had 444 offices in India. Essentially 
it is a commercial bank with 55 percent of government capital and special 
status. It has been entrusted with the special t ask of developing bank-
i ng facilities i n the rural areas. It is the biggest commercial bank 
in the country, operating through more than 1 ,000 branches and with total 
deposits amounting to nearly one-third of the net aggregate deposits of 
all scheduled banks in India.9 
Co-operative banks are the peculiar feature of the financial struc-
ture, not from the view point of monetary management but from the view 
point of the economic development. They receive deposit s and make loans 
and thereby mobilize scattered savings. The co-operative banks operate 
in the rural areas and are designed mainly to privide finance at reason-
able low r ates to agriculturalists. They also borrow funds from the State 
Bank and the Reserve Bank. They are given special concessions in their 
borrowings. 
8K. C. Chacko, The Monetary and Fiscal Policy for India (Vora and 
Company, Bombay, 19571":" p. 13. -
9Ibid., p. 78-80. See also "Banks Are Not for Banging," Eastern 
Economist, Volume 42 (January 24, 1964), p. 125. 
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Non-bank Financial Institutions 
Quasi-government bodies and large sized joint stock companies also 
participate in the operations of the money market as lenders. The 
Industrial Financial Corporation provides long and medium-term finance 
to industries in the private sector. The National Industrial Development 
Corporation works for both the public and the private sectors. Ninety 
percent of its capital is subscribed by the government. The Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation is an experiment in international 
investment for private industries. The State Finance Corporations 
provide finance to medium and small scale industries. All these in-
stitutions have greatly widened the range of the capital market in 
India. They are intended not only to extend credit but to underwrite 
the securities of the industrial concerns. They supplement bank finance 
for industries to a certain extent by granting medium and long-term 
loans. The Reserve Bank's policies do have an indirect effect on the 
lending policies of these institutions, However, as in Western countries 
the existence of the non-bank financial institutions is a factor limit-
ing effective monetary policy, "However, since credit can also be ob-
tained from other financial institutions, the number of which in India 
is large and whose activities are not subject to quantitative control 
by the central bank, the efficacy of a restrictive monetary policy is 
seriously reduced.1110 
The Reserve Bank of India as the central bank occupies the most 
important place in the financial structure of the country. In addi-
tion to acting as a banker to the government and the commercial banks, 
10H. M. Roy, The Role of Monetary Policy in Economic Development 
(World Press, Calcutta7"1962)', p. 21J. 
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it has contributed to the provision of the cheap agricultural credit 
on co-operative basis. It has also helped to establish the specialized 
institutions for providing the long-term finance. "Perhaps in no other 
country has a central bank taken such an active role in the economic 
development of the country as in India. 11 11 
B. General Credit Controls 
1 • Bank- Rate 
The credit control mechanism is a somewhat complicated and dif-
ficult task for the Reserve Bank of India because of the existence of 
an unorganized and less monetized sector as well as the absence of a 
well developed bill market. Bank-rate has no significance as a discount 
rate. The large portfolios of government securities enables the banks 
to acquire needed cash through the sale of the securities rather than 
through rediscounts with the Reserve Bank. An expanding public sector 
also reduces the feasibility of using the bank-rate on a considerable 
scale. A rise in the bank-rate would increase the cost of government 
borrowing for the public sector. "· , • In a planned economy which has 
a large public sector of investment and where government has a battery 
of powers of direct regulation of investment, the efficacy of bank-rate 
changes is far less clear than it is in industrially advanced countries 
with a 1free 1 economy. 11 12 After 16 years of its operation, the Reserve 
Bank raised the bank-rate from three percent to three and one-half per-
cent for the first time in November, 1951. After that, it has been 
11 K. c. Chacko, The Monetary and Fiscal Policy of India (Vora and 
Company, Bombay, 1957J.P• 300. · · 
12H. v. R. Iengar, Monetary Policy and Economic Q_rowth (Vora and 
Company, Bombay, 1962), P• 139. -
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used several times along with the other measures to ,check the growing 
inflationary pressures. Bank-rate was raised to five percent i n Sep-
tember, 1964, to make credit costlier. 
2. Changes in Reserve Requirements 
The Reserve Bank has the power to vary the reserve-rat io of the 
commercial banks between five percent to 20 percent of the demand deposits 
and t wo percent to eight percent of the time deposits. As a measure of 
general credit control, a variable reserve-ratio has not been used ex-
tensively. 
J. Open Market Operations 
Open market operations are largely used to facilitate the govern-
ment borrowing program. They are also used to help commercial banks 
tide over the seasonal monetary stringency i n the busy season and t o 
invest their surplus reserves in the slack season. "Broadly speaking, 
in India, open market operations have not assumed t he role of a full-
fledged instrument of credit policy.n13 
c. Selective Credit Controls 
This brief account of the financial structure and credit control 
mechanism with the above mentioned indirect instruments does not tel l 
the complete story. The large holdings of government securities by 
commercial banks and the policy of price support and a fixed pattern 
of interest rates followed by the monetary authorities have made the 
general instruments less effective unless supported by direct or selec-
tive controls, simultaneously. In fact, after the Second World War in 
13Ibid. , P• 199. 
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almost all countries, the central banks had to resort to the direct 
control to fight against inflation. 
During the Second World War, efforts were made to control bank 
advances against specified commodities, including bullion, through 
an ordinance issued under the Defence Regulation. After the war the 
Reserve Bank tried to influence the banks' policies with regard to their 
advances and investments through advice, requests, etc., with only limited 
success. So the Reserve Bank equipped itself under Section 21 of the 
Indian Bsnking Companies Act, 1949, to introduce selective credit con-
trols on an obligatory basis. With the beginning of the economic plan-
ning (by a series of Five Year Plans) in India, the Reserve Bank of 
India had a special responsibility. It has had to shape its monetary 
policy in such a way that rising prices are kept in check without re-
tarding production. 14 "The solution to such a situation is not a general 
tightening of credit or a general relaxation; it is selective control. 111 5 
1. Moral Suasion 
Especially during the Second Five Year Plan, because of the heavy 
deficit financing and inflationary dangers, the Reserve Bank had to 
use selective credit controls quite extensively. During the June 1955 
to May 1956 period, food prices rose by 15 percent and bank advances 
against food-grains were 11.5 percent higher compared with the previous 
year. So in May, 1956, the Reserve Bank directed all the scheduled 
banks to ban fresh advances of more than Rs. 50,000 against paddy and 
14r. G. Patel, "Monetary Policy in Post-war Years," I.M.F. Staff 
Papers, Volume J (1953), p. 72. 
15H. V. R. Iengar, Monetary Policy and Economic Development (Vora 
and Company, Bombay, 1962), p. 7. 
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rice. They were also asked not to increase their total advances by 
more than 25 percent over those in the corresponding month of the last 
year. 
2. Margin Requirements 
Existing margins were raised by 10 percent of the value of the 
security offered. In February, 1957, margin limits were raised to 
35 percent. The Bank imposed similar restrictions on advances against 
16 
other food grains to curb the inflation. In June, 1957, margin re-
quirements were raised to 40 percent. Fresh advances exceeding Rs. 
50,000 were totally banned. Advances against paddy and rice were re-
stricted to 66.7 percent and those against other food grains to 75 per-
cent of their respective amounts as in the corresponding week of 1956. 
In December, 1957, measures were tightened up. Restrictions on 
advances against cotton manufacturers and sugar were imposed. The banks 
were required to freeze the credit limits at the existing level. The 
' . 
margin for sugar was raised to 45 percent in July, 1958. Groundnuts 
were brought under selective control in February, 1959, with a margin 
requirement of at least 45 percent. In May, 1960, selective controls 
were extended to all kinds of oilseeds. At the same time the degree 
of control was relaxed for rice and paddy in certain states, In April, 
1961, margin requirements in regard to sugar were withdrawn. All re-
strictions relating to advances against wheat were removed in May, 1961. 
In 1963 selective credit controls were extended to advances against 
160. P. Jain, "Evaluation of Selective Credit Controls in India, 11 
Indian Journal of Economics, Volume 41 (1960-1961 ), p. 173-175· 
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warehouse receipts covering food grains (excluding wheat). Margin of 
25 percent was applied to such advances. 
All throughout the Second Five Year Plan, various directives as 
mentioned above were issued requiring the banks to restrict and limit 
advances against food-grains and other agricultural articles. And 
whenever the situation permitted, the degree of restraint was decreased. 
However, it was indicated that these agricultural commodities were the 
chief inflation breeding spots for the economy which required continuous 
watch by the authorities. During each phase of the price-rise, the 
prices of agricultural commodities went up more than the prices of manu-
factured articles. This can be seen from the table on the next page. 
Upward trend of prices had been greatly accentuated by bank financed 
speculativehoa:ro:ing of food-grain& That is why the selective credit 
controls are applied mostly to the bank advances against food-grains 
and oilseeds. The general pattern of the controls is to raise the mar-
gins and set limits to the advances in a particular direction. To make 
them more perfect and effective, schemes have been devised to fix up the 
margins and limits of the advances before the agricultural season starts. 
It is expected that this would prevent speculative tendencies growing 
up from the very beginning. However, it is very difficult to know about 
the prospects of the c9ming crops and determine the degree of control 
required for the next season. 
J. Consumer Credit Control 
Unlike the Unites States and the United Kingdom, consumer credit 
is not a very important component of total advances of commercial banks, 
as seen from Table V. As a result there did not arise any need to apply 
consumer credit controls to the commercial banks in India. 
Item 
All commodities 
Food, articles 
Industrial raw 
materials 
Manufactured 
articles 
90 
84 
93 
98 
102 
99 
113 
TABLE DT 
WHOLESALE PRICE TRENDS, 1955-1963 
_(1952-1953 = 100) 
111 112 116 
109 113 119 
121 115 120 
104 109 108 109 
120 
140 
120 
Source: Eastern Economis!, Volume 39 (August 10, 1962), p. 268-270. 
Easte.!'.E, Economist, Volume 42 (June 12, 1964), p. 1383-1384. 
126 127 
121 125 
149 136 
126 129 
June 
12..siJ 
134 
143.8 
138.7 
129.1 
V\ 
---.J 
Year 
1949 
1952 
1954 
1963 
TABLE V 
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LOANS 
OF SCHEDULED BANKS 
Amount Percentage of 
(Rs. in million) total advances 
382 8.7 
396 7.8 
476 3.5 
1 • 117 6.9 
Source: K. c. Chacko, The Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy of India:-1Vora and Company. 
Bombay,~193?Y:-p. 102; and Eastern 
Economist, Volume 42 (January 24, 
1964), P• 126. 
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It is impossible to segregate the effects of the selective ere-
dit controls and evaluate them when other instruments of credit con-
trol are also used simultaneously. All that can be said with regard 
to the effectiveness of selective credit controls is that if these con-
trols had not been introduced, speculative operations would have been 
larger and more damaging than they actually were. This was the obser-
vation of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Indiaf7 The reports also 
indicated that as a result of the selective credit controls, the ad-
vances of the connnercial banks against food-grains and sugar declined 
to a considerable extent.· The decline in bank credit for these items 
was essential to bring down speculative and hoarding tendencies of the 
traders. 
There were some weak spots in the application of selective ere-
dit controls which probably helped evasion to some extent. Until 1963 
17no v. Ro Iengar, Monetau Pollet and Economic Growth_ (Vora.and 
Company, Bombay, 1962), P• 203. 
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the control did not apply to the advances against warehouse receipts, 
with a view to encourage the development of warehouses and use of ware-
house receipts as a security for bank advances. Similarly, advances 
granted to co-operative marketing societies still continue to be exempt 
from the scope of the directives. 
In Western countries, the aim of the selective cred.it controls 
is to control demand for durable consumer goods to check inflation. 
In India the objective is to prevent speculative hoarding of commodities 
so as to prevent an undue rise in their prices (thereby controlling 
inflation breeding spots in the economy) and to channel bank funds into 
desired channels. The background of a loosely organized money market, 
with the existence of an indigenous banking sector is entirely different 
from the background of financial structure in Western countries. The 
active participation of the Reserve Bank of India in providing and ex-
tending credit facilities to different sectors of the developing economy 
is peculiar. 
The officially accepted objective of a "socialistic pattern of 
society• and the consequent expansion of the public sector in the plan-
ned economy of India gives a glimpse into the prevailing socio-political 
ideology which is different from that of the United States. Successful 
nationalization of the Imperial Bank of India and Life Insurance, a 
highly progressive taxation and similar developments reflect that India 
is not a doctrinaire against the state initiative, direction and par-
ticipation in the economy. Successful implementation of a series of 
Five Year Plans and consequent changes in the monetary-fiscal policies 
reflect the determination of the government of India to achieve the 
goal of rapid economic development. As a result unlike the United 
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States, there does not exist public resentment against selective ere-
dit controls on the ground of undue interference of the state in the 
economic life of the nation. Probably this is an important factor 
causing extensive use of the selective credit controls along with other 
instruments. Here it is interesting to refer to the case of Norway. 
"The Bank of Norway considers that since it has no organized money 
market and its banking system is highly decentralized, it must prac-
tice direct and selective credit policies ••• 1117 
17F. M. Tamagna, "Process and Instrument of Monetary Policy: A 
Comparative Analysis," Mon~tar;y: }!~rs~me~~ (Commission on Money and 
Credit, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 9DJJ, p. 146. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The need has arisen in view of the post-war economic problems to 
increase the effectiveness and promptness of monetary policy. As one 
of the means to achieve this objective, the central bank requires use 
of both the general and selective credit controls. The question does 
not arise about the substitution of one for the other. "The desirable 
solution in the eyes of this observer requires the co-ordination of 
the general and selective credit control instruments in a manner mak-
ing possible a stronger role for monetary policy in the future. 111 
Though it is very difficult to separate the effects and evaluate the role 
of the selective credit controls, it can be said that the experience 
in the countries studied here indicate usefulness of the selective ere-
dit controls. 
Advantages and disadvantages of selective credit controls are dis-
cussed widely and opinions vary greatly. Along with the severe criti9ism 
of the selective credit controls some constructive thinking is also 
done in the direction as to how the selective credit controls can be 
used purposefully. "In view of the pervasiveness of selective controls 
in one form or another, they are not something that one can be unequi-
vocally for or against. The issue is not whether, but how, they shall 
1R. F. Shay, "Justification for Direct Regulation of Consumer Credit 
Reappraised," Journal of Finance, Volume 8 (1953), p. 276. 
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be used. 112 A similar remark has been made by R. S. Sayers in milder 
tone. "More generally, we can say that when an unusually difficult 
situation calls for sharp effects, direct control of bank advances can 
be justified; its disadvantages are of the kind that point to early 
relaxation rather than complete avoidance. 113 In developing economies, 
selective credit controls are given a permanent place in the armory of 
the instruments of credit control. 
The experience with selective credit controls in the United Kingdom , 
the United States, and India differs greatly. The selective controls 
in the United Kingdom are less compulsory in nature because of more 
reliance on moral suasion. In India selective credit controls are more 
compulsory i n nature, margin requirements being used predominantly. 
Both in the United Kingdom and India, selective credit controls are 
used quite extensively without any ideological objection to them. In 
the United States popular objection to the selective credit controls 
is too strong to allow the Federal Reserve System to re-introduce con-
sumer credit control. Different types and techniques of selective ere-
dit controls are adopted in different countries to suit their needs. 
In India selective credit control i s viewed as a tool for economic 
growth, while in the United States it is considered as a policy measure 
for stabilization purposes. 
2Arthur Smithies, "Uses of Selective Credit Controls, 11 United States 
Monetary Policy (American Assembly, Columbia University, 195~p':'° 74;~ 
3R. S. Sayers, Modern Bankin~ (Clarendon Press, Oxford , fourth 
edition , 1958), p. 255. 
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